



Proxy voting guidelines for U.S. securities

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Contents

Contents	1
Introduction	2
Voting guidelines	2
Boards and directors	2
Auditors and audit-related issues	7
Capital structure proposals	8
Mergers, asset sales, and other special transactions	9
Remuneration and benefits	10
Social, ethical and environmental issues	13
General corporate governance matters	13
Appendix: Our approach to Say on Pay	16

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These guidelines should be read in conjunction with BlackRock's Global Corporate Governance and Engagement Principles, which are available on-line at www.blackrock.com

Introduction

BlackRock, Inc. and its subsidiaries (collectively, "BlackRock") seek to make proxy voting decisions in the manner most likely to protect and promote the economic value of the securities held in client accounts. The following issue-specific proxy voting guidelines (the "Guidelines") are intended to summarize BlackRock's general philosophy on corporate governance matters and approach to issues that may commonly arise in the proxy voting context for U.S. securities. These Guidelines are not intended to limit the analysis of individual issues at specific companies and are not intended to provide a guide to how BlackRock will vote in every instance. Rather, they share our view about corporate governance issues generally, and provide insight into how we typically approach issues that commonly arise on corporate ballots as well as our expectations of boards of directors. They are applied with discretion, taking into consideration the range of issues and facts specific to the company and the individual ballot item.

Voting guidelines

These guidelines are divided into six key themes which group together the issues that frequently appear on the agenda of annual and extraordinary meetings of shareholders.

The six key themes are:

- ▶ Boards and directors
- ▶ Auditors and audit-related issues
- ▶ Capital structure, mergers, asset sales and other special transactions
- ▶ Remuneration and benefits
- ▶ Social, ethical and environmental issues
- ▶ General corporate governance matters

Boards and directors

Director elections

BlackRock generally supports board nominees in most uncontested elections. BlackRock may withhold votes from certain directors on the board or members of particular board committees (or prior members, as the case may be) in certain situations, including, but not limited to:

- ▶ The independent chair or lead independent director and members of the governance committee, where a board fails to implement shareholder proposals that receive a majority of votes cast at a prior shareholder meeting, and the proposals, in our view, have a direct and substantial impact on shareholders' fundamental rights or long-term economic interests.

- ▶ The independent chair or lead independent director and members of the governance committee, where a board implements or renews a poison pill without seeking shareholder approval beforehand or within a reasonable period of time after implementation.
- ▶ The independent chair or lead independent director and members of the governance committee, where a board amends the charter/articles/by-laws such that the effect may be to entrench directors or to significantly reduce shareholder rights. In such cases, in determining whether to withhold support from directors, we will consider in part the company's publicly stated rationale for the changes and whether the board has determined to seek shareholder approval beforehand or within a reasonable period of time after implementation.
- ▶ The independent chair or lead independent director, members of the nominating committee, and/or the longest tenured director(s), where we observe a lack of board responsiveness to shareholders on board composition concerns, evidence of board entrenchment, insufficient attention to board diversity, and/or failure to promote adequate board succession planning over time in line with the company's stated strategic direction.
- ▶ An insider or affiliated outsider who sits on the board's audit, compensation, nominating or governance committees (the "key committees"), which we believe generally should be entirely independent. However, BlackRock will examine a board's complete profile when questions of independence arise prior to casting a withhold vote for any director. For controlled companies, as defined by the U.S. stock exchanges, we will only vote against insiders or affiliates who sit on the audit committee, but not other key committees.
- ▶ Members of the audit committee during a period when the board failed to facilitate quality, independent auditing, for example, if substantial accounting irregularities suggest insufficient oversight by that committee.
- ▶ Members of the audit committee during a period in which we believe the company has aggressively accounted for its equity compensation plans.
- ▶ Members of the compensation committee during a period in which executive compensation appears excessive relative to performance and peers, and where we believe the compensation committee has not already substantially addressed this issue.
- ▶ Members of the compensation committee where the company has repriced options without contemporaneous shareholder approval.
- ▶ The chair of the nominating committee, or where no chair exists, the nominating committee member with the longest tenure, where board member(s) at the most recent election of directors have received withhold votes from more than 30% of shares voting and the board has not taken appropriate action to respond to shareholder concerns. This may not apply in cases where BlackRock did not support the initial withhold vote.
- ▶ The chair of the nominating committee, or where no chair exists, the nominating committee member with the longest tenure, where the board is not composed of a majority of independent directors. However, this would not apply in the case of a controlled company.
- ▶ Where BlackRock obtains evidence that casts significant doubt on a director's qualifications or ability to represent shareholders.
- ▶ Where it appears the director has acted (at the company or at other companies) in a manner that compromises his or her reliability in representing the best long-term economic interests of shareholders.

- ▶ Where a director has a pattern of poor attendance at combined board and applicable key committee meetings. Excluding exigent circumstances, BlackRock generally considers attendance at less than 75% of the combined board and applicable key committee meetings by a board member to be poor attendance.
- ▶ Where a director has committed himself or herself to service on a large number of boards, such that we deem it unlikely that the director will be able to commit sufficient focus and time to a particular company (commonly referred to as “over-boarding”). While each situation will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, BlackRock is most likely to withhold votes for over-boarding where a director is: 1) serving on more than four public company boards; or 2) is a chief executive officer at a public company and is serving on more than two public company boards in addition to the board of the company where they serve as chief executive officer.

If a board maintains a classified structure, it is possible that the director(s) with whom we have a particular concern may not be subject to election in the year that the concern arises. In such situations, if we have a concern regarding a committee or committee chair, we generally register our concern by withholding votes from all members of the relevant committee who are subject to election that year.

Director independence

We expect that a board should be majority independent. We believe that an independent board faces fewer conflicts and is best prepared to protect shareholder interests. Common impediments to independence in the U.S. may include, but are not limited to:

- ▶ Employment by the company or a subsidiary as a senior executive within the previous five years
- ▶ Status as a founder of the company
- ▶ Substantial business or personal relationships with the company or the company’s senior executives
- ▶ Family relationships with senior executives or founders of the company
- ▶ An equity ownership in the company in excess of 20%

Board composition and effectiveness

We encourage boards to routinely refresh their membership to ensure the relevance of the skills, experience and attributes of each director to the work of the board. To ensure that the board remains effective, regular reviews of board performance should be carried out and assessments made of gaps in skills or experience amongst the members. BlackRock believes it is beneficial for new directors to be brought onto the board periodically to refresh the group’s thinking and to ensure both continuity and adequate succession planning. We believe that the nominating committee of the board has the ability to implement such refreshment. In identifying potential candidates, boards should take into consideration the diversity of experience and expertise of the current directors and how that might be augmented by incoming directors. We encourage boards to disclose their views on: the mix of competencies, experience and other qualities required to effectively oversee and guide management; the process by which candidates are identified and selected, including whether professional firms or other sources outside of incumbent directors’ networks have been engaged to identify and/or assess candidates; the process by which boards evaluate themselves and any significant outcomes of the evaluation process, without divulging inappropriate and/or sensitive details; the consideration given towards board diversity, including, but not limited to, diversity of gender, race, age, experience, and skills; and other factors taken into account in the nomination process.

While we support regular board refreshment, we are not opposed in principle to long-tenured directors nor do we believe that long board tenure is necessarily an impediment to director independence. We believe that a variety of director tenures within the boardroom can be beneficial to ensure board quality and continuity of experience; our primary concern

is that board members are able to contribute effectively as corporate strategy evolves and business conditions change over time, and that all directors, regardless of tenure, demonstrate appropriate responsiveness to shareholders over time. We acknowledge that each director brings their own unique skills and experiences and that no single person can be expected to bring all relevant skill sets to a board; at the same time, we generally do not believe it is necessary or appropriate to have any particular director on the board solely by virtue of a singular background or specific area of expertise.

As a result of the nominating committee's responsibility for board composition and refreshment over time, we typically oppose shareholder proposals imposing arbitrary limits on the pool of directors from which shareholders can choose their representatives. However, where boards find that age limits or term limits are the most efficient and objective mechanism for ensuring periodic board refreshment, we generally defer to the board's determination in setting such limits.

Board size

We generally defer to the board in setting the appropriate size. We believe directors are generally in the best position to assess what size is optimal to ensure a board's effectiveness. However, we may oppose boards that appear too small to allow for effective shareholder representation or too large to function efficiently.

CEO and management succession planning

There should be a robust CEO and management succession plan in place at the board level that is reviewed and updated on a regular basis. We expect succession planning to cover both long-term planning consistent with the strategic direction of the company and identified leadership needs over time as well as short-term planning in the event of an unanticipated executive departure. We acknowledge that both internal and external management candidates may be considered, as informed by required skill sets and cultural fit considerations and as appropriate to the company's circumstances. We encourage the company to explain its executive succession planning process, including where accountability lies within the boardroom for this task, without prematurely divulging sensitive information commonly associated with this exercise.

Classified board of directors/staggered terms

A classified board of directors is one that is divided into classes (generally three), each of which is elected on a staggered schedule (generally for three years). At each annual meeting, only a single class of directors is subject to reelection (generally one-third of the entire board).

We believe that classification of the board dilutes shareholders' right to evaluate promptly a board's performance and limits shareholder selection of their representatives. By not having the mechanism to immediately address concerns we may have with any specific director, we may be required to register our concerns through our vote on the directors who are subject to election that year (see "Director elections" for additional detail). Furthermore, where boards are classified, director entrenchment is more likely, because review of board service generally only occurs every three years. Therefore, we typically vote against classification and for proposals to eliminate board classification.

Contested director elections

Most director elections are not competitive, but shareholders are sometimes presented with competing slates of director candidates. Generally, such proxy contests are the result of a shareholder (or group of shareholders) seeking to change the company's strategy or address failures in the board's oversight of management. The details of proxy contests are assessed on a case-by-case basis. We evaluate a number of factors, which may include, but are not limited to: the qualifications of the dissident and management candidates; the validity of the concerns identified by the dissident; the viability of both the dissident's and management's plans; the likelihood that the dissident's solutions will produce the desired change; and whether the dissidents represent the best option for enhancing long-term shareholder value.

Cumulative voting for directors

Cumulative voting allocates one vote for each share of stock held, times the number of directors subject to election. A shareholder may cumulate his/her votes and cast all of them in favor of a single candidate, or split them among any combination of candidates. By making it possible to use their cumulated votes to elect at least one board member, cumulative voting is typically a mechanism through which minority shareholders attempt to secure board representation.

We typically oppose proposals that further the candidacy of minority shareholders whose interests do not coincide with our fiduciary responsibility. We may support cumulative voting proposals at companies where the board is not majority independent. We may support cumulative voting at companies that have a controlling shareholder. A cumulative voting structure is not consistent with a majority voting requirement, as it may interfere with the capacity of director candidates to achieve the required level of support. We may not support a cumulative voting proposal at a company that has adopted a majority voting standard.

Director compensation and equity programs

We believe that compensation for independent directors should be structured to align the interests of the directors with those of shareholders, whom the directors have been elected to represent. We believe that independent director compensation packages based on the company's long-term performance and that include some form of long-term equity compensation are more likely to meet this goal; therefore, we typically support proposals to provide such compensation packages. However, we will generally oppose shareholder proposals requiring directors to own a minimum amount of company stock, as we believe that companies should maintain flexibility in administering compensation and equity programs for independent directors, given each company's and director's unique circumstances. As discussed in further detail under the heading "Equity compensation plans" below, we believe that companies should prohibit directors from engaging in transactions with respect to their long-term compensation that might disrupt the intended economic alignment between equity plan beneficiaries and shareholders.

Indemnification of directors and officers

We generally support reasonable but balanced protection of directors and officers. We believe that failure to provide protection to directors and officers might severely limit a company's ability to attract and retain competent leadership. We generally support proposals to provide indemnification that is limited to coverage of legal expenses. However, we may oppose proposals that provide indemnity for: breaches of the duty of loyalty; transactions from which a director derives an improper personal benefit; and actions or omissions not in good faith or those that involve intentional misconduct.

Majority vote requirements

BlackRock generally supports proposals seeking to require director election by majority vote. Majority voting standards assist in ensuring that directors who are not broadly supported by shareholders are not elected to serve as their representatives. We note that majority voting is not appropriate in all circumstances, for example, in the context of a contested election. We also recognize that some companies with a plurality voting standard have adopted a resignation policy for directors who do not receive support from at least a majority of votes cast. Where we believe that the company already has a sufficiently robust majority voting process in place, we may not support a shareholder proposal seeking an alternative mechanism.

Risk oversight

Companies should have an established process for identifying, monitoring and managing key risks, and independent directors should have ready access to relevant management information and outside advice, as appropriate, to ensure they can properly oversee risk management. We encourage companies to provide transparency as to the optimal risk levels, how risk is measured and how risks are reported to the board. We are particularly interested to understand how risk oversight processes evolve in response to changes in corporate strategy and/or shifts in the business and related risk environment. Boards should clearly explain their approach to risk oversight, including where accountability lies within the boardroom for this activity, especially where there are multiple individuals or board committees tasked with oversight of various risks.

Separation of chairman and CEO positions

We believe that independent leadership is important in the board room. In the U.S. there are two commonly accepted structures for independent board leadership: 1) an independent chairman; or 2) a lead independent director. We assess the experience and governance track record of the independent chairman or lead independent director to understand capability and suitability to effectively and constructively lead a board. Our expectations of an individual in this role include, but are not limited to: being available to serve as an advisor to the CEO; contributing to the oversight of CEO and management succession planning; and being available to meet with shareholders when they have highly sensitive concerns about management or corporate governance issues. We generally consider the designation of a lead independent director as an acceptable alternative to an independent chair if the lead independent director has a term of at least one year and has powers to: 1) provide formal input into board meeting agendas; 2) call meetings of the independent directors; and 3) preside at meetings of independent directors. Where a company does not have a lead independent director that meets these criteria, we generally support the separation of chairman and CEO.

Shareholder access to the proxy

We believe that long-term shareholders should have the opportunity, when necessary and under reasonable conditions, to nominate individuals to stand for election to the boards of the companies they own and to have those nominees included on the company's proxy card. This right is commonly referred to as "proxy access". In our view, securing a right of shareholders to nominate directors without engaging in a control contest can enhance shareholders' ability to participate meaningfully in the director election process, stimulate board attention to shareholder interests, and provide shareholders an effective means of directing that attention where it is lacking. Given the complexity of structuring an appropriate proxy access mechanism and the brevity required of shareholder proposals, we generally expect that a shareholder proposal to adopt proxy access will describe general parameters for the mechanism, while providing the board with flexibility to design a process that is appropriate in light of the company's specific circumstances. Proxy access mechanisms should provide shareholders with a reasonable opportunity to use this right without stipulating overly restrictive or onerous parameters for use, and also provide assurances that the mechanism will not be subject to abuse by short-term investors, investors without a substantial investment in the company, or investors seeking to take control of the board. We will review proposals regarding the adoption of proxy access on a case-by-case basis.

Auditors and audit-related issues

BlackRock recognizes the critical importance of financial statements that provide a complete and accurate portrayal of a company's financial condition. Consistent with our approach to voting on boards of directors, we seek to hold the audit committee of the board responsible for overseeing the management of the audit function at a company, and may withhold votes from the audit committee's members where the board has failed to facilitate quality, independent auditing. We look to the audit committee report for insight into the scope of the audit committee's responsibilities, including an overview of audit committee processes, issues on the audit committee's agenda and key decisions taken by the audit committee. We

take particular note of cases involving significant financial restatements or material weakness disclosures, and we expect timely disclosure and remediation of accounting irregularities.

The integrity of financial statements depends on the auditor effectively fulfilling its role. To that end, we favor an independent auditor. In addition, to the extent that an auditor fails to reasonably identify and address issues that eventually lead to a significant financial restatement, or the audit firm has violated standards of practice that protect the interests of shareholders, we may also vote against ratification.

From time to time, shareholder proposals may be presented to promote auditor independence or the rotation of audit firms. We may support these proposals when they are consistent with our views as described above.

Capital structure proposals

Blank check preferred

We frequently oppose proposals requesting authorization of a class of preferred stock with unspecified voting, conversion, dividend distribution and other rights ("blank check" preferred stock) because they may serve as a transfer of authority from shareholders to the board and a possible entrenchment device. We generally view the board's discretion to establish voting rights on a when-issued basis as a potential anti-takeover device, as it affords the board the ability to place a block of stock with an investor sympathetic to management, thereby foiling a takeover bid without a shareholder vote. Nonetheless, where the company appears to have a legitimate financing motive for requesting blank check authority, has committed publicly that blank check preferred shares will not be used for anti-takeover purposes, has a history of using blank check preferred stock for financings, or has blank check preferred stock previously outstanding such that an increase would not necessarily provide further anti-takeover protection but may provide greater financing flexibility, we may support the proposal.

Equal voting rights

BlackRock supports the concept of equal voting rights for all shareholders. Some management proposals request authorization to allow a class of common stock to have superior voting rights over the existing common or to allow a class of common to elect a majority of the board. We oppose such differential voting power as it may have the effect of denying shareholders the opportunity to vote on matters of critical economic importance to them.

When a management or shareholder proposal requests to eliminate an existing dual-class voting structure, we seek to determine whether the cost of restructuring will have a clear economic benefit to our clients' portfolio(s). We evaluate these proposals on a case-by-case basis, and we consider the level and nature of control associated with the dual-class voting structure as well as the company's history of responsiveness to shareholders in determining whether support of such a measure is appropriate.

Increase in authorized common shares

BlackRock considers industry specific norms in our analysis of these proposals, as well as a company's history with respect to the use of its common shares. Generally, we are predisposed to support a company if the board believes additional common shares are necessary to carry out the firm's business. The most substantial concern we might have with an increase is the possibility of use of common shares to fund a poison pill plan that is not in the economic interests of shareholders.

Increase or issuance of preferred stock

These proposals generally request either authorization of a class of preferred stock or an increase in previously authorized preferred stock. Preferred stock may be used to provide management with the flexibility to consummate beneficial acquisitions, combinations or financings on terms not necessarily available via other means of financing. We generally support these proposals in cases where the company specifies the voting, dividend, conversion and other rights of such stock where the terms of the preferred stock appear reasonable.

Stock splits and reverse stock splits

We generally support stock splits that are not likely to negatively affect the ability to trade shares or the economic value of a share. We generally support reverse splits that are designed to avoid delisting or to facilitate trading in the stock, where the reverse split will not have a negative impact on share value (e.g. one class is reduced while others remain at pre-split levels). In the event of a proposal to reverse split that would not also proportionately reduce the company's authorized stock, we apply the same analysis we would use for a proposal to increase authorized stock.

Mergers, asset sales, and other special transactions

In reviewing merger and asset sale proposals, BlackRock's primary concern is the best long-term economic interests of shareholders. While these proposals vary widely in scope and substance, we closely examine certain salient features in our analyses. The varied nature of these proposals ensures that the following list will be incomplete. However, the key factors that we typically evaluate in considering these proposals include:

- ▶ For mergers and asset sales, we assess the degree to which the proposed transaction represents a premium to the company's trading price. In order to filter out the effects of pre-merger news leaks on the parties' share prices, we consider a share price from multiple time periods prior to the date of the merger announcement. In most cases, business combinations should provide a premium. We may consider comparable transaction analyses provided by the parties' financial advisors and our own valuation assessments. For companies facing insolvency or bankruptcy, a premium may not apply.
- ▶ There should be a favorable business reason for the combination.
- ▶ Unanimous board approval and arm's-length negotiations are preferred. We will consider whether the transaction involves a dissenting board or does not appear to be the result of an arm's-length bidding process. We may also consider whether executive and/or board members' financial interests in a given transaction appear likely to affect their ability to place shareholders' interests before their own.
- ▶ We prefer transaction proposals that include the fairness opinion of a reputable financial advisor assessing the value of the transaction to shareholders in comparison to recent similar transactions.

Poison pill plans

Also known as Shareholder Rights Plans, these plans generally involve issuance of call options to purchase securities in a target firm on favorable terms. The options are exercisable only under certain circumstances, usually accumulation of a specified percentage of shares in a relevant company or launch of a hostile tender offer. These plans are often adopted by the board without being subject to shareholder vote.

Poison pill proposals generally appear on the proxy as shareholder proposals requesting that existing plans be put to a vote. This vote is typically advisory and therefore non-binding. We generally vote in favor of shareholder proposals to rescind poison pills.

Where a poison pill is put to a shareholder vote, our policy is to examine these plans individually. Although we oppose most plans, we may support plans that include a reasonable ‘qualifying offer clause.’ Such clauses typically require shareholder ratification of the pill, and stipulate a sunset provision whereby the pill expires unless it is renewed. These clauses also tend to specify that an all cash bid for all shares that includes a fairness opinion and evidence of financing does not trigger the pill, but forces either a special meeting at which the offer is put to a shareholder vote, or the board to seek the written consent of shareholders where shareholders could rescind the pill in their discretion. We may also support a pill where it is the only effective method for protecting tax or other economic benefits that may be associated with limiting the ownership changes of individual shareholders.

Reimbursement of expenses for successful shareholder campaigns

Proxy contests and other public campaigns can be valuable mechanisms for holding boards of underperforming companies accountable to their shareholders. However, these campaigns can also lead to unwarranted cost and distraction for boards and management teams, and may be imposed by investors whose interests are not aligned with other investors. Therefore, we generally do not support proposals seeking the reimbursement of proxy contest expenses, even in situations where we support the shareholder campaign, as we believe that introducing the possibility of such reimbursement may incentivize disruptive and unnecessary shareholder campaigns.

Remuneration and benefits

We note that there are both management and shareholder proposals related to executive compensation that appear on corporate ballots. We generally vote on these proposals as described below, except that we typically oppose shareholder proposals on issues where the company already has a reasonable policy in place that we believe is sufficient to address the issue. We may also oppose a shareholder proposal regarding executive compensation if the company’s history suggests that the issue raised is not likely to present a problem for that company.

Advisory resolutions on executive compensation (“Say on Pay”)

In cases where there is a Say on Pay vote, BlackRock will respond to the proposal as informed by our evaluation of compensation practices at that particular company, and in a manner that appropriately addresses the specific question posed to shareholders. We describe in the Appendix herein (“Our approach to Say on Pay”) our beliefs and expectations related to executive compensation practices, our Say on Pay analysis framework, and our typical approach to engagement and voting on Say on Pay.

Advisory votes on the frequency of Say on Pay resolutions (“Say When on Pay”)

BlackRock will generally opt for a triennial vote on Say on Pay. We believe that shareholders should undertake an annual review of executive compensation and express their concerns through their vote on the members of the compensation committee. As a result, it is generally not necessary to hold a Say on Pay vote on an annual basis, as the Say on Pay vote merely supplements the shareholder’s vote on compensation committee members. However, we may support annual Say on Pay votes in some situations, for example, where we conclude that a company has failed to align pay with performance.

Claw back proposals

Claw back proposals are generally shareholder sponsored and seek recoupment of bonuses paid to senior executives if those bonuses were based on financial results that are later restated or were otherwise awarded as a result of deceptive business practices. We generally favor recoupment from any senior executive whose compensation was based on faulty

financial reporting or deceptive business practices, regardless of that particular executive's role in the faulty reporting. We typically support these proposals unless the company already has a robust claw back policy that sufficiently addresses our concerns.

Employee stock purchase plans

An employee stock purchase plan ("ESPP") gives the issuer's employees the opportunity to purchase stock in the issuer, typically at a discount to market value. We believe these plans can provide performance incentives and help align employees' interests with those of shareholders. The most common form of ESPP qualifies for favorable tax treatment under Section 423 of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 423 plans must permit all full-time employees to participate, carry restrictions on the maximum number of shares that can be purchased, carry an exercise price of at least 85 percent of fair market value on grant date with offering periods of 27 months or less, and be approved by shareholders. We will typically support qualified ESPP proposals.

Equity compensation plans

BlackRock supports equity plans that align the economic interests of directors, managers and other employees with those of shareholders. We believe that boards should establish policies prohibiting use of equity awards in a manner that could disrupt the intended alignment with shareholder interests, for example: use of the stock as collateral for a loan; use of the stock in a margin account; use of the stock (or an unvested award) in hedging or derivative transactions. We may support shareholder proposals requesting the board to establish such policies.

Our evaluation of equity compensation plans is based on a company's executive pay and performance relative to peers and whether the plan plays a significant role in a pay-for-performance disconnect. We generally oppose plans that contain "evergreen" provisions allowing for the unlimited increase of shares reserved without requiring further shareholder approval after a reasonable time period. We also generally oppose plans that allow for repricing without shareholder approval. We may also oppose plans that provide for the acceleration of vesting of equity awards even in situations where an actual change of control may not occur. We encourage companies to structure their change of control provisions to require the termination of the covered employee before acceleration or special payments are triggered. Finally, we may oppose plans where we believe that the company is aggressively accounting for the equity delivered through their stock plans.

Golden parachutes

Golden parachutes provide for compensation to management in the event of a change in control. We generally view golden parachutes as encouragement to management to consider transactions that might be beneficial to shareholders. However, a large potential payout under a golden parachute arrangement also presents the risk of motivating a management team to support a sub-optimal sale price for a company.

We may support shareholder proposals requesting that implementation of such arrangements require shareholder approval. We generally support proposals requiring shareholder approval of plans that exceed 2.99 times an executive's current salary and bonus, including equity compensation.

When determining whether to support or oppose an advisory vote on a golden parachute plan ("Say on Golden Parachutes"), we normally support the plan unless it appears to result in payments that are excessive or detrimental to shareholders. In evaluating golden parachute plans, BlackRock may consider several factors, including:

- whether we believe that the triggering event is in the best interest of shareholders;
- an evaluation of whether management attempted to maximize shareholder value in the triggering event;

- the percentage of total transaction value that will be transferred to the management team, rather than shareholders, as a result of the golden parachute payment;
- whether excessively large excise tax gross up payments are part of the payout;
- whether the pay package that serves as the basis for calculating the golden parachute payment was reasonable in light of performance and peers; and/or
- whether the golden parachute payment will have the effect of rewarding a management team that has failed to effectively manage the company.

It may be difficult to anticipate the results of a plan until after it has been triggered; as a result, BlackRock may vote against a Say on Golden Parachute proposal even if the golden parachute plan under review was approved by shareholders when it was implemented.

Option exchanges

BlackRock may support a request to exchange underwater options under the following circumstances: the company has experienced significant stock price decline as a result of macroeconomic trends, not individual company performance; directors and executive officers are excluded; the exchange is value neutral or value creative to shareholders; and there is clear evidence that absent repricing the company will suffer serious employee incentive or retention and recruiting problems. BlackRock may also support a request to exchange underwater options in other circumstances, if we determine that the exchange is in the best interest of shareholders.

Pay-for-Performance plans

In order for executive compensation exceeding \$1 million to qualify for federal tax deductions, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) requires companies to link that compensation, for the company's top five executives, to disclosed performance goals and submit the plans for shareholder approval. The law further requires that a compensation committee comprised solely of outside directors administer these plans. Because the primary objective of these proposals is to preserve the deductibility of such compensation, we generally favor approval in order to preserve net income.

Pay-for-Superior-Performance

These are typically shareholder proposals requesting that compensation committees adopt policies under which a portion of equity compensation requires the achievement of performance goals as a prerequisite to vesting. We generally believe these matters are best left to the compensation committee of the board and that shareholders should not set executive compensation or dictate the terms thereof. We may support these proposals if we have a substantial concern regarding the company's compensation practices over a significant period of time, the proposals are not overly prescriptive, and we believe the proposed approach is likely to lead to substantial improvement.

Supplemental executive retirement plans

BlackRock may support shareholder proposals requesting to put extraordinary benefits contained in Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans ("SERP") agreements to a shareholder vote unless the company's executive pension plans do not contain excessive benefits beyond what is offered under employee-wide plans.

Social, ethical and environmental issues

Our fiduciary duty to clients is to protect and enhance their economic interest in the companies in which we invest on their behalf. It is within this context that we undertake our corporate governance activities. We believe that well-managed companies will deal effectively with the social, ethical and environmental (“SEE”) aspects of their businesses.

BlackRock expects companies to identify and report on the material, business-specific SEE risks and opportunities and to explain how these are managed. This explanation should make clear how the approach taken by the company best serves the interests of shareholders and protects and enhances the long-term economic value of the company. The key performance indicators in relation to SEE matters should also be disclosed and performance against them discussed, along with any peer group benchmarking and verification processes in place. This helps shareholders assess how well management is dealing with the SEE aspects of the business. Any global standards adopted should also be disclosed and discussed in this context.

We may vote against the election of directors where we have concerns that a company might not be dealing with SEE issues appropriately. Sometimes we may reflect such concerns by supporting a shareholder proposal on the issue, where there seems to be either a significant potential threat or realized harm to shareholders’ interests caused by poor management of SEE matters. In deciding our course of action, we will assess whether the company has already taken sufficient steps to address the concern and whether there is a clear and material economic disadvantage to the company if the issue is not addressed.

More commonly, given that these are often not voting issues, we will engage directly with the board or management. The trigger for engagement on a particular SEE concern is our assessment that there is potential for material economic ramifications for shareholders.

We do not see it as our role to make social, ethical or political judgments on behalf of clients. We expect investee companies to comply, at a minimum, with the laws and regulations of the jurisdictions in which they operate. They should explain how they manage situations where such laws or regulations are contradictory or ambiguous.

General corporate governance matters

We believe that shareholders should have the right to vote on key corporate governance matters, including on changes to governance mechanisms and amendments to the charter/articles/by-laws. We may vote against certain directors where changes to governing documents are not put to a shareholder vote within a reasonable period of time, in particular if those changes have the potential to impact shareholder rights (see “Director elections” herein). In cases where a board’s unilateral adoption of changes to the charter/articles/by-laws promotes cost and operational efficiency benefits for the company and its shareholders, we may support such action if it does not have a negative effect on shareholder rights or the company’s corporate governance structure.

When voting on a management or shareholder proposal to make changes to charter/articles/by-laws, we will consider in part the company’s and/or proponent’s publicly stated rationale for the changes, the company’s governance profile and history, relevant jurisdictional laws, and situational or contextual circumstances which may have motivated the proposed changes, among other factors. We will typically support changes to the charter/articles/by-laws where the benefits to shareholders, including the costs of failing to make those changes, demonstrably outweigh the costs or risks of making such changes.

Adjourn meeting to solicit additional votes

We generally support such proposals unless the agenda contains items that we judge to be detrimental to shareholders’ best long-term economic interests.

Bundled proposals

We believe that shareholders should have the opportunity to review substantial governance changes individually without having to accept bundled proposals. Where several measures are grouped into one proposal, BlackRock may reject certain positive changes when linked with proposals that generally contradict or impede the rights and economic interests of shareholders.

Corporate political activities

Companies may engage in certain political activities, within legal and regulatory limits, in order to influence public policy consistent with the companies' values and strategies, and thus serve shareholders' best long-term economic interests. These activities can create risks, including: the potential for allegations of corruption; the potential for reputational issues associated with a candidate, party or issue; and risks that arise from the complex legal, regulatory and compliance considerations associated with corporate political activity. We believe that companies which choose to engage in political activities should develop and maintain robust processes to guide these activities and to mitigate risks, including a level of board oversight.

When presented with shareholder proposals requesting increased disclosure on corporate political activities, we may consider the political activities of that company and its peers, the existing level of disclosure, and our view regarding the associated risks. We generally believe that it is the duty of boards and management to determine the appropriate level of disclosure of all types of corporate activity, and we are generally not supportive of proposals that are overly prescriptive in nature. We may determine to support a shareholder proposal requesting additional reporting of corporate political activities where there seems to be either a significant potential threat or actual harm to shareholders' interests and where we believe the company has not already provided shareholders with sufficient information to assess the company's management of the risk.

Finally, we believe that it is not the role of shareholders to suggest or approve corporate political activities; therefore we generally do not support proposals requesting a shareholder vote on political activities or expenditures.

Other business

We oppose giving companies our proxy to vote on matters where we are not given the opportunity to review and understand those measures and carry out an appropriate level of shareholder oversight.

Reincorporation

Proposals to reincorporate from one state or country to another are most frequently motivated by considerations of anti-takeover protections, legal advantages, and/or cost savings. We will evaluate, on a case-by-case basis, the economic and strategic rationale behind the company's proposal to reincorporate. In all instances, we will evaluate the changes to shareholder protection under the new charter/articles/by-laws to assess whether the move increases or decreases shareholder protections. Where we find that shareholder protections are diminished, we may support reincorporation if we determine that the overall benefits outweigh the diminished rights.

IPO governance

We expect boards to consider and disclose how the corporate governance structures adopted upon initial public offering (“IPO”) are in shareholders’ best long-term interests. We also expect boards to conduct a regular review of corporate governance and control structures, such that boards might evolve foundational corporate governance structures as company circumstances change, without undue costs and disruption to shareholders.

We will typically apply a one-year grace period for the application of certain director-related guidelines (including, but not limited to, director independence and over-boarding considerations), during which we expect boards to take steps to bring corporate governance standards in line with our expectations.

Further, if a company qualifies as an emerging growth company (an “EGC”) under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (the “JOBS Act”), we will give consideration to the NYSE and NASDAQ governance exemptions granted under the JOBS Act for the duration such a company is categorized as an EGC. We expect an EGC to have a totally independent audit committee by the first anniversary of its IPO, with our standard approach to voting on auditors and audit-related issues applicable in full for an EGC on the first anniversary of its IPO.

Shareholders’ right to act by written consent

In exceptional circumstances and with sufficiently broad support, shareholders should have the opportunity to raise issues of substantial importance without having to wait for management to schedule a meeting. We therefore believe that shareholders should have the right to solicit votes by written consent provided that: 1) there are reasonable requirements to initiate the consent solicitation process in order to avoid the waste of corporate resources in addressing narrowly supported interests; and 2) support from a minimum of 50% of outstanding shares is required to effectuate the action by written consent. We may oppose shareholder proposals requesting the right to act by written consent in cases where the proposal is structured for the benefit of a dominant shareholder to the exclusion of others, or if the proposal is written to discourage the board from incorporating appropriate mechanisms to avoid the waste of corporate resources when establishing a right to act by written consent. Additionally, we may oppose shareholder proposals requesting the right to act by written consent if the company already provides a shareholder right to call a special meeting that we believe offers shareholders a reasonable opportunity to raise issues of substantial importance without having to wait for management to schedule a meeting.

Shareholders’ right to call a special meeting

In exceptional circumstances and with sufficiently broad support, shareholders should have the opportunity to raise issues of substantial importance without having to wait for management to schedule a meeting. We therefore believe that shareholders should have the right to call a special meeting in cases where a reasonably high proportion of shareholders (typically a minimum of 15% but no higher than 25%) are required to agree to such a meeting before it is called, in order to avoid the waste of corporate resources in addressing narrowly supported interests. However, we may oppose this right in cases where the proposal is structured for the benefit of a dominant shareholder to the exclusion of others. We generally believe that a right to act via written consent is not a sufficient alternative to the right to call a special meeting.

Simple majority voting

We generally favor a simple majority voting requirement to pass proposals. Therefore, we will support the reduction or the elimination of supermajority voting requirements to the extent that we determine shareholders’ ability to protect their economic interests is improved. Nonetheless, in situations where there is a substantial or dominant shareholder, supermajority voting may be protective of public shareholder interests and we may support supermajority requirements in those situations.

Appendix: Our Approach to Say on Pay

We describe herein our beliefs and expectations related to executive compensation practices, our Say on Pay analysis framework, and our typical approach to engagement and voting on Say on Pay. We provide our views on this issue in somewhat more detail than other issues covered in these Guidelines because of the particular focus on executive compensation matters in the U.S. Although we expect proxy disclosures to be the primary mechanism for companies to explain their executive compensation practices, we may engage with members of management and/or the compensation committee of the board, where concerns are identified or where we seek to better understand a company's approach to executive compensation. We may also decline opportunities to engage with companies where we do not have any questions or concerns or believe that these Guidelines already cover the issues at hand.

Beliefs and Expectations Related to Executive Compensation Practices

- We believe that compensation committees are in the best position to make compensation decisions and should maintain significant flexibility in administering compensation programs, given their knowledge of the strategic plans for the company, the industry in which the company operates, the appropriate performance measures for the company, and other issues internal and/or unique to the company.
- Companies should explicitly disclose how incentive plans reflect strategy and incorporate long-term shareholder value drivers; this discussion should include the commensurate metrics and timeframes by which shareholders should assess performance.
- We support incentive plans that foster the sustainable achievement of results. Although we believe that companies should identify those performance measures most directly tied to shareholder value creation, we also believe that emphasis should be on those factors within management's control to create economic value over the long-term, which should ultimately lead to sustained shareholder returns over the long-term. Similarly, the vesting timeframes associated with incentive plans should facilitate a focus on long-term value creation, as appropriate to that particular company.
- While we do support the concept of compensation formulas that allow shareholders to clearly understand the rationale for compensation decisions, we do not believe that a solely formulaic approach to executive compensation necessarily drives shareholder value. BlackRock believes that compensation committees should use their discretion in designing incentive plans, establishing pay quanta, and finalizing compensation decisions, and should demonstrate how decisions are aligned with shareholder interests.
- BlackRock does not discourage compensation structures that differ from market practice. However, where compensation practices differ substantially from market practice, e.g. in the event of unconventional incentive plan design or extraordinary decisions made in the context of transformational corporate events or turnaround situations, we expect clear disclosure explaining how the decisions are in shareholders' best interests.
- We understand that compensation committees are undertaking their analysis in the context of a competitive marketplace for executive talent. We acknowledge that the use of peer group evaluation by compensation committees can help ensure competitive pay; however we are concerned about the potential ratchet effect of explicit benchmarking to peers. We therefore believe that companies should use peer groups to maintain an awareness of peer pay levels and practices so that pay is market competitive, while mitigating potential ratcheting of pay that is disconnected from actual performance.
- We expect companies to select peers that are broadly comparable to the company in question, based on objective criteria that are directly relevant to setting competitive compensation; we evaluate peer group selection based on factors including, but not limited to, business size, relevance, complexity, risk profile, and/or geography.

- We do not believe that arbitrary limits on potential compensation are necessarily in shareholders' best interests if those limits have the potential to cap performance. However, we expect compensation committees to ensure that incentive plans do not incentivize excessive risk taking beyond the company's determined risk appetite and that rewards are reasonable in light of returns to shareholders.
- We do not set forth a preference between cash, restricted stock, performance based equity awards, and stock options, amongst other compensation vehicles. We acknowledge that each may have an appropriate role in recruiting and retaining executives, in incentivizing behavior and performance, and in aligning shareholders' and executives' interests. Compensation committees should clearly disclose the rationale behind their selection of pay vehicles and how these fit with intended incentives. We also observe that different types of awards exhibit varying risk profiles, and the risks associated with pay plan design should be in line with the company's stated strategy and risk appetite.
- We expect compensation committees to consider and respond to the shareholder voting results of relevant proposals at previous years' annual meetings, and other feedback received from shareholders, as they evaluate compensation plans. At the same time, compensation committees should ultimately be focused on incentivizing long-term shareholder value creation and not necessarily on achieving a certain level of support on Say on Pay at any particular shareholder meeting.

Say on Pay Analysis Framework

- We analyze the compensation practices in the context of the company's stated strategy and identified value drivers and seek to understand the link between strategy, value drivers and incentive plan design.
- We examine both target and realizable compensation in order to understand the compensation committee's intended outcomes, to judge the appropriateness and rigor of performance measures and hurdles, and to assess the pay plan's sensitivity to the performance of the company.
- We review the pay and performance profiles of the company's disclosed peer companies, as applicable, to identify relative outliers for potential further analysis. We supplement our analysis of the company's stated peers with an independent review of peer companies as identified by third party vendors and our own analysis; part of this analysis includes an assessment of the relevance of the company's stated peers and the potential impact the company's peer selection may have on pay decisions.
- We conduct our analysis over various time horizons, with an emphasis on a sustained period, generally 3-5 years; however we consider company-specific factors, including the timeframe the company uses for performance evaluation, the nature of the industry, and the typical business cycle, in order to identify an appropriate timeframe for evaluation.
- We review key changes to pay components from previous years and consider the compensation committee's rationale for those changes.
- We examine extraordinary pay items (including but not limited to actual or contractual severance payments, inducement grants, one-time bonus and/or retention awards) to understand the compensation committee's rationale and alignment with shareholder interests.
- We may engage with members of management and/or the compensation committee of the board, where concerns are identified or where we seek to better understand a company's approach to executive compensation.
- We consider BlackRock's historical voting decisions (including whether a concern that led to a previous vote against management has been addressed, or whether we determined to support management at previous shareholder meetings with the expectation of future change), engagement activity, other corporate governance concerns at the company, and the views of our portfolio managers.

- We assess the board's responsiveness to shareholder voting results of relevant proposals at previous years' annual meetings, and other feedback received from shareholders.

Engagement and Voting on Say on Pay

- In many instances, we believe that direct discussion with issuers, in particular with the members of the compensation committee, can be an effective mechanism for building mutual understanding on executive compensation issues and for communicating any concerns we may have on executive compensation.
- In the event that we determine engagement is not expected to lead to resolution of our concerns about executive compensation, we may consider voting against members of the compensation committee, consistent with our preferred approach to hold members of the relevant key committee of the board accountable for governance concerns. As a result, our Say on Pay vote is likely to correspond with our vote on the directors who are compensation committee members responsible for making compensation decisions.
- We may determine to vote against the election of compensation committee members and/or Say on Pay proposals in certain instances, including but not limited to when:
 - We identify a misalignment over time between target pay and/or realizable compensation and company performance as reflected in financial and operational performance and/or shareholder returns;
 - We determine that a company has not persuasively demonstrated the connection between strategy, long-term shareholder value creation and incentive plan design;
 - We determine that compensation is excessive relative to peers without appropriate rationale or explanation, including the appropriateness of the company's selected peers;
 - We observe an overreliance on discretion or extraordinary pay decisions to reward executives, without clearly demonstrating how these decisions are aligned with shareholders' interests;
 - We determine that company disclosure is insufficient to undertake our pay analysis; and/or
 - We observe a lack of board responsiveness to significant investor concern on executive compensation issues.